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The Justice Department Merger
Guidelines: Impact on Horizontal
Mergers Between Commercial Banks
By MARC W. JOSEPH* AND TIMOTHY W. MOUNTZ**
INTRODUCTION
Banks merge because it is profitable for them to do so.' They
may expect to realize profits from merging for a number of
reasons: (1) an expansion of capital assets raising the resulting
bank's loan limit may make that bank more attractive to larger
borrowers and more competitive with those banks previously ser-
vicing those borrowers; (2) the resulting bank may be able to realize
economies of scale not available to a smaller bank or may be able
to provide a solution to the management problems encountered by
one of the banks; or (3) perhaps the resulting bank may be able
to offer a more complete range of banking services.2 This list is
not exhaustive, but whatever the reason, one can assume that the
bank seeking merger has concluded that it is less costly or more
profitable to accomplish its goals by merging with another bank
than by expanding internally or by de novo branching.3
If the merging banks conduct their business within the same
geographic market, then the merger is "horizontal." 4 Horizontal
mergers eliminate existing competition within a geographic market.
* Associate, Rain Harrell Emery Young & Doke, Dallas, Texas. B.S. 1975, United
States Naval Academy; J.D. 1983, Vanderbilt University.
** Associate, Rain Harrell Emery Young & Doke, Dallas, Texas. B.A. 1976, Southern
Methodist University; J.D. 1979, Duke University.
Although the opinions expressed and any errors made in this Article are the authors'
own, Mr. Joseph gratefully acknowledges the guidance and encouragement offered by Mr.
Terry Calvani (Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission) during Mr. Calvani's tenure as
a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University.
Mitchell, Mergers Among Commercial Banks, in MONETARY ECONomcs 63 (1971).
E. KINTNER, PRI R ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 413 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
KINTNER-MERGERS]; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 63.
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 63-64.
See Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4503 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Guidelines].
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For example, after a horizontal merger between two banks, there
will be one less bank competing for bank customers. Thus, the
market is more concentrated and generally is viewed as less
competitive.'
Congress has expressed its concern about the anticompetitive
effects of over-concentration through the enactment of various
federal statutes, including the Sherman Act,' Clayton Act,' Bank
Merger Act," and Bank Holding Company Act.9 These laws are
enforced by the Department of Justice (Department) and the several
bank regulatory agencies. 10 In the event that a merger, either pro-
posed or consummated, appears to result in a restraint of trade
or a monopoly, or creates a substantial probability of a substan-
tial lessening of competition or a tendency to restrain trade, the
affected product and geographic markets must be defined in order
to determine whether such probabilities exist, prior to the initia-
tion of any enforcement proceedings.
The Supreme Court has defined "commercial banking," a
unique "cluster" of banking products and services, as the relevant
product market to be considered in the event that a merger between
two commercial banks is challenged by the Department or one of
the regulatory agencies. I The Supreme Court has drawn a distinc-
tion between "commercial banking" and the relevant product
market comprising thrifts12 and other nonbanking financial institu-
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 602, at 836-37 (3d ed. 1981).
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-44, 1846-49 (1982).
tO See notes 136-50 infra and accompanying text for discussion of federal regulation
of banking under the Bank Merger Act. Although the Federal Trade Commission has an
important role in antitrust enforcement, it has no jurisdiction over banks, due to a specific
statutory exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
" See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 324-27, 326 n.5 (1963).
See also notes 201-02 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's general
description of "commercial banking" in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.
12 "Thrifts" are savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks and credit unions.
1 W. SCHLICHTING, T. RIcE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 1.03[2] (1982). For a list of
other nonbanking financial institutions which offer some competition to commercial banks,
see Yesley, Defining the Product Market in Commercial Banking, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
CLEV. ECON. REV., June-July 1972, at 17. See also note 202 infra for a list of nonbanking
institutions described as "more or less" competitors of commercial banks by the Supreme
Court in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.
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tions. Nevertheless, "commercial banking" may no longer be a
realistic definition for the product market competitively affected
when two commercial banks merge. Various state and federal laws,
including the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980,'" have changed the competitive complexion
of the banking industry. Thrifts are now authorized to participate
in numerous banking activities previously engaged in only by com-
mercial banks.' 4 The Supreme Court, however, has steadfastly
declined to include thrifts in the same product market as commer-
cial banks until those thrifts become "significant participants" in
the commercial banking industry."
Numerous lower federal court and bank regulatory agency
opinions reflect a belief that thrifts exert a real competitive in-
fluence on the commercial banking line of commerce, even if those
thrifts are not "significant participants" in the same line of
commerce.'6 There is a trend among those agencies, economists and
legal scholars to recognize thrifts as full competitors and to include
thrifts and commercial banks in the same line of commerce when
analyzing the competitive effects of a merger between two com-
mercial banks."'
On June 14, 1982, the Department promulgated its Merger
Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982 (1982 Guidelines).'" The
1982 Guidelines established new standards, emphasizing the
economist's approach, for defining product and geographic markets
and measuring concentration in merger cases.' 9 Although these
guidelines were written to apply to any merger subject to scrutiny
under section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 7 of the Clayton
Act,2" the Department may use them to analyze the competitive
" Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
'4 See note 205 infra for a discussion of the expansion of thrift powers under the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
1 See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). For a discus-
sion of Connecticut Nat'l Bank, see notes 209-18 infra and accompanying text.
"6 See note 197 infra for a discussion of court opinions. See notes 219-31 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of agency opinions.
" See notes 226-31 infra and accompanying text.
" See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4500-05.
" See notes 104, 117-21 infra and accompanying text.
20 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4501.
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effects of a horizontal merger between commercial banks. 2' Thus,
how the new standards differ from those previously established by
the Department or developed in case law merits attention.
This Article first discusses the changes the 1982 Guidelines have
made in measuring market concentration and defining product
markets. Next, the Article surveys case law standards for defin-
ing product markets. Finally, while recognizing that the courts are
not bound by the 1982 Guidelines, this Article will analyze the likely
effects those guidelines will have on bank merger antitrust cases.
I. MEASURING CONCENTRATION: THE EFFECT OF NEW
GUIDELINES
A. Introduction
A significant effect of the 1982 Guidelines was to replace the
four-firm concentration ratio, used in the Department guidelines
issued in 1968,22 with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as
the method of measuring market concentration.23 The significance
of the Department's change to the HHI and how that change af-
fects the Department's review of applications for horizontal mergers
is best understood when set against the background of debates giv-
ing rise to that change.
B. The Economic Debates
Two distinct levels of debate continue to rage in the economic
background of the process leading to the Department's selection
of the HHI as the method of measuring market concentration: (1)
whether there is a relationship between competition and concen-
tration; and (2) once it is accepted that such a relationship exists,
which method of measuring concentration yields the most accurate
results.
, See notes 236-39 infra and accompanying text.
Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1968, 2 TRADE RaG. REP. (CCH)
4510 [hereinafter cited as 1968 Guidelines]. For a discussion of the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio, see notes 33-45 infra and accompanying text.
2" See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4503. See also Justice Department Unveils
Long-A waited Revisions to Merger Guidelines: FTC Issues Statement on Mergers, [Jan.-
June] ANrrusT & TADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at 1251 (June 17, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Justice Department Unveils].
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1. The Relationship Between Competition and Concentration
a. The Argument That Such a Relationship Does Not Exist
In a nutshell, the proponents of this argument contend "that
industry concentration implies little or nothing about the com-
petitiveness of the industry and that deconcentration by legal ac-
tion would be a very bad public policy mistake."" Rather than
hamper the greater economies of scale resulting from larger firm
size, these proponents insist that the focus of inquiry should be
upon collusion and the likelihood of its occurrence." Furthermore,
according to Professor Yale Brozen, collusion is more likely to oc-
cur in unconcentrated than in concentrated markets.26
,b. The Argument That Such a Relationship Does Exist
The proponents of this argument contend that competitive
vigor is "related positively to the number of firms in the relevant
market."' 27 Viewed another way, one such proponent postulates
that a concentrated market is more likely to suffer from
monopolistic practices. " Economists place these concepts within
the mold of their Structure - Conduct - Performance (SCP)
paradigm: "[T]he structure of the market significantly affects the
conduct of buyers and especially sellers in such activities as price-
setting and product policy, and.., their conduct in turn deter-
mines the ultimate economic performance-good, bad, or
indifferent-of the market."
29
"The most frequently articulated.., prediction of the [SCP]
paradigm," according to Professor Scherer, states "that high
[market] concentration leads in various ways to a greater elevation
24 Is There a Relationship Between Concentration and Competition?, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 79 (E. Fox & J. Halverson ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as INDUSTRIu CONCENTRATION].
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 F. SCHERR, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 56
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER] (emphasis in original).
23 See Marfels, A Bird's Eye View to Measures of Concentration, 20 ANTITRUST BULL.
485, 485 (1975).
2, Scherer, Structure-Performance Relationships and Antitrust Policy, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION, supra note 24, at 128 (emphasis in original).
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of prices above unit costs and hence to higher profit returns."3
Thus, in effect, there is a causal link between concentration and
profitability. Professor Posner has stated that one of these ways
is collusion: "[T]he more highly concentrated a market is, the
likelier it is that an exchange of information will foster collusion
rather than simply help to equilibrate demand and supply .... -I,
Professor Fox has described the relationship between concen-
tration and competition as a continuum: (1) at one end the "struc-
turalists" sacrifice scale economies in favor of the dispersion of
power which results from market fragmentation; (2) at the other
end the "free market school" views competition as the means for
achieving the most efficient allocation of market resources, with
largeness reflecting efficiency; and (3) between those two camps
reside those realists who believe a relationship exists between con-
centration and competition only where concentration reaches high
levels at which market power exists to control price and output."2
Although it is not certain which of these characterizations most
accurately describes the relationship existing between concentra-
tion and competition, one thing is clear: the Department has
adopted the argument that a relationship does exist between con-
centration and competition. Thus, the issue left for debate is which
method of measuring concentration should be applied.
2. Methods for Measuring Concentration
a. The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio
The Department's 1968 Guidelines adopted the four-firm con-
centration ratio as the method for measuring market
concentration.33 The concentration ratio, generally for four firms,
30 Id.
31 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 145 (1976).
3 Fox, Economic Concentration, Efficiencies and Competition: Social Goals and
Political Choices, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 24, at 138-39.
33 1968 Guidelines, supra note 22, at 6884. Those guidelines state that in a highly
concentrated market, such as a market in which the four largest firms hold approximately
75% or more of the market, "the Department [would] ordinarily challenge mergers be-
tween firms accounting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
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can be derived from the concentration curve.3 4 The curve, drawn
for a specific market, "describes the cumulative percentage of total
industry size accounted for by its largest firms, ' ' 35 thus graphically
representing the total percentage of market sales or assets for a
varying number of leading firms in that market. 36 For example,
a concentration ratio for four firms is only a single point on the
curve.3 A curve, however, graphically depicting combined market
shares for three, four, eight or more leading firms in an industry,
provides the viewer with a more complete picture of the concen-
tration of that market. Although the concentration ratio suffers
the disadvantage of concealing the full structure of the industry
by using perhaps only a single point on the curve,38 it nevertheless
fulfills "the analytic needs of those interested in the 'phenomena
of big business' -39 or those who are trying to show how a small
number of firms fit into the economy.4"
Professor Adelman has suggested that "fewness" in the
market, adequately represented by the concentration ratio, is the
proper object of study in defining concentration 4' and is essential
Id.
In a less concentrated market, like a market in which the four largest firms hold less
than 7501o of the market, the Department would challenge a merger between firms holding
the following approximate shares:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5%/ 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% 1% or more
Id.
" See Marfels, supra note 28, at 486. See also E. SINGER, ANTTRUST ECONOWCS
139-40 (1968).
" Marfels, supra note 28, at 486 (emphasis added).
36 E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 139 (citing FEDERAL TRADE CoMMSSION, CONCEN-
TRATION OF PRODucTrvE FACILrrIS, 1947 (1949)).
, Marfels, supra note 28, at 486. See also F. ScHaERE, supra note 27, at 56-57.
' E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 140. Use of the concentration ratio, as opposed to
the graphic representation provided by the curve, prevents meaningful comparisons of con-
centration between particular industries where one industry may comprise many more firms
than the other. Id.
11 Id. at 137 (quoting Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33
REv. EcON. & STATIsTIcs 269, 270 (1951)).
I0 d.
4 See id. at 138 (quoting Adelman, Differential Rates and Changes in Concentra-
tion, 41 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 68 (1959)).
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to the understanding of competition and monopoly.42 Others,
however, have contended that, rather than fewness, size disparity
or dispersion between the largest and smallest firms in a market
is the key to understanding competition.43 Proponents of the lat-
ter view equate size disparity with concentration so that, as the size
disparity increases between the largest and smallest firms in the
market, the degree of concentration increases." Those same sup-
porters of the size disparity theory of concentration also believe
that because the change in size disparity "can have significant reper-
cussions on competition," the study of market structure should not
be confined to the top few firms.1
5
b. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The HHI is a summary measure of concentration;46 by in-
cluding in its calculation all firms on the concentration curve, it
provides a more complete picture of that market.4 7 The HHI also
can "be viewed as a measure of dispersion." ' Thus, the HHI
satisfies the two disadvantages of the four-firm concentration ratio:
it provides an overall picture of a given market and more fully
satisfies those economists who equate size disparity with
concentration. 9 Developed independently during the late 1940's by
two noted economists, 0. C. Herfindahl and A. 0. Hirschman, 0
the HHI should be used "when concentration is a function of both
unequal distribution and fewness.""5
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the percent-
42 Id.
41 Id. at 137. See, e.g., Prais, The Statistical Conditions for a Change in Business
Concentration, 40 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 268 (1958).
4, E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 137.
Id.
46 See Marfels, supra note 28, at 488.
See Weinstock, Using the Herfindahl Index to Measure Concentration, 27 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 285, 285, 287 (1982).
"1 E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 153. The summary measure concentration index "is
normally related to various statistical concepts of dispersion." Id. at 136-37.
41 See Weinstock, supra note 47, at 285-87.
,0 See Adelman, Comment on the "H" Concentration Measure as Numbers-
Equivalent, 51 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 99, 99 (1969); Hirschman, The Paternity of an
Index, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 761, 761 (1964); Weinstock, supra note 47, at 286 n.2.
11 Hirschman, supra note 50, at 761 (emphasis in original).
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age market shares of all firms within the relevant market.52 In a
pure monopoly the Hi1 equals 10,000.11 In a completely
fragmented market, the HHI approaches zero. 4 In a market of
n firms, all with equal market shares, the HHI would equal the
fraction 10,000/n. 5 As the total number of firms (n) increases, the
value of the HHI decreases. 6 Because squaring results in giving
greater weight in the HHI to the market shares of larger firms, the
value of the HHI increases as the size disparity between firms
increases." Thus, according to Professor Scherer, "to the extent
that monopoly power is correlated positively with both fewness of
sellers and inequality in their sizes, the [HHI] comes close to be-
ing an ideal composite measure." 58 Stated slightly differently, the
HHI, because of its weighting effect, is a better index than the con-
centration ratio for those wishing "to stress the dominance of the
largest firms.'' 9
The Department's Antitrust Division had those principles in
mind when it replaced the four-firm concentration ratio with the
HHI for measuring market concentration." Specifically, the An-
titrust Division expressed its belief that because the HHI squared
the percentage market shares of all firms in a given market, it is
12 See Weinstock, supra note 47, at 286. For variations of the precise mathematical
equation describing this calculation, compare id. at 300 with E. SINGER, supra note 34, at
153. See also note 53 infra.
11 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 6881-11 n.29. Although most economists calculate
the HHI using fractional rather than percentage market share, the Justice Department sug-
gests calculating the HHI by summing the squares of the percentage of the market held
by each firm in the market. Id. at 6881-11. Thus, in a perfect monopoly where one firm
held 100% of the market, the HHI would equal (100)' or 10,000. Id. at 6881-11 n.29.
" Winstock, supra note 47, at 286-87.
5 Under the economists' method of calculation, the HHI would equal 1/n. See supra
note 53. See also E. SINoER, supra note 34, at 153; Weinstock, supra note 47, at 290.
56 F. ScHRaER, supra note 27, at 58.
" See Weinstock, supra note 47, at 290 (Table 2a).
"F. SCHERER, INDUsTRIAL MARKET STRucTuRE AND ECONOMIC PERFORANCE 51-52
(1970). It should be noted that Professor Scherer deleted this passage from his most re-
cent edition of the same work. See F. ScmRR, supra note 27, at 58.
" Marfels, supra note 28, at 488-90.
" See Comments of the U.S. Department of Justice, In re Statement of Policy on
Bank Acquisition (of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), No. R-0386,
at 24 (filed Apr. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Justice Comments]. Cf. Werden, Market
Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 517 ("The
Guidelines recognize that the size distribution of sellers in a market is the primary, but not
the exclusive, indicator of the likelihood of collusion.").
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"a more sensitive barometer" of market structure and is "par-
ticularly sensitive to the relative magnitudes of market shares."',
Thus, the Antitrust Division commentators concluded that the HHI
provided a means with which "to predict which markets may be
prone to collusion."
62
The HHI has certain disadvantages. The calculation encom-
passes the market shares of all firms within a market, and such
information is often difficult to acquire, depending upon the in-
dustry involved. 63 The HHI is also somewhat insensitive to the con-
tribution of the market shares of the smallest firms, 6 as squaring
results in overweighting the market share significance of the largest
firms. 65 Of course, such overweighting may be desirable if the rele-
vant SCP paradigm stresses dominance.66 The overweighting,
however, makes accuracy in the measurement of the largest firms'
market shares crucial.
If one accepts the theory that competitive vigor is a function
of firm numerosity and, thus, that there is a difference in the com-
petitive behavior between a market comprising 100 firms with
nearly equal shares and another market in which four firms con-
trol eighty percent and the remaining twenty percent is shared by
ninety-six other firms,68 then the HHI may be the best suited
method for measuring concentration and describing the competitive
environment. 69 Nevertheless, studies indicate that concentration
measurement with the four-firm concentration ratio closely cor-
relates with that of the HHI.70 Those or similar studies may have
prompted Professor Scherer to state, upon learning that the Depart-
ment had adopted the HHI as its concentration measurement
method, that no empirical evidence exists demonstrating the HHI
6: Justice Comments, supra note 60, at 24.
62 Id.
11 F. SC IsER, supra note 27, at 58; Weinstock, supra note 47, at 287.
11 Weinstock, supra note 47, at 287 n.6.
65 F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 58; E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 153-54 (quoting
W. WOYTINSKY, EARNINGS AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1943)).
66 See F. SCHERER, supra note 58, at 51-52 & n.38; Marfels, supra note 28, at 488-90.
67 F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 58.
11 See id. at 56-58.
69 See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
10 F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 58.
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to be a superior method for explaining the relationship between
concentration and profitability or competitive behavior.
71
In addition, the four-firm concentration ratio and the HHI
share a common weakness in that their statistical accuracy depends
upon the successful accomplishment of the difficult task of prop-
erly defining the relevant product and geographic markets.72
Perhaps it is this common weakness which caused Professor
Scherer's further remark that the Department's selection of the
HHI was "like picking a sharp scalpel to do surgery on something
[they] don't understand.
'"7
Nearly two decades after the invention of the HHI, Professor
Adelman remarked that the HHI had not been widely used. 74 The
HHI has enjoyed a checkered career since that remark was made,
with lower federal courts either rejecting75 or accepting but not
utilizing 76 the HHI as the relevant method for measuring market
concentration.7 7 The HHI has not fared much better in ad-
ministrative proceedings. Although used in one recent proceeding
before a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) administrative law
judge,78 the HHI has been rejected in the past by the full FTC
because "it had never been used before."
79
" See Antitrust Practitioners React Favorably to New Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June]
ANTrrRUST & TADE REG. REP'. (BNA) No. 1017, at 1317 (June 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Practitioners].
SWeinstock, supra note 47, at 287 n.5.
7 Practitioners, supra note 71, at 1317.
, Adelman, supra note 50, at 99.
, See, e.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md.
1976). The court rejected the HHI as the applicable measure of market concentration because
other courts uniformly used the concentration ratio and, thus, there was a "lack of com-
parability to data from earlier authority." Id. at 748 n.38. See Weinstock, supra note 47,
at 292-93 & n.13 for a discussion of Black & Decker.
7' See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D.
Ohio 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981). See Weinstock, supra note 47, at 293 for
a brief discussion of Marathon Oil.
" See Weinstock, supra note 47, at 292-95.
" See In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1981) (initial decision). The administrative law
judge held that despite an HHI increase from 2,230 in 1945 to 2,760 in 1970, the three
largest ready-to-eat cereal manufacturers did not share a monopoly. Id. at 77, 269. See
Weinstock, supra note 47, at 295 for a discussion of Kellogg Co.




C. Use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the 1982
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
The Department replaced the four-firm concentration ratio used
in its 1968 Guidelines with the HHI in the 1982 Guidelines for two
reasons: (1) the HHI, as a summary measure, reflects distribution
of market shares not only for the leading firms, but throughout
the relevant market; and (2) the proportionately greater weight
given to the larger firms by squaring their market shares "probably
accords with their relative importance in any collusive
interaction." 0
In its 1982 Guidelines for horizontal mergers, the Department
established three levels of market concentration as measured by the
HHI: (1) the unconcentrated market would be reflected by post-
merger HHI below 1,000, which would approximate a market com-
prised of at least ten equally sized firms; (2) a post-merger HHI
between 1,000 and 1,800 would indicate a moderately concentrated
market; and (3) a post-merger HHI above 1,800 would indicate a
highly concentrated market.8' In deciding whether to challenge a
merger, the Department will evaluate "both the post-merger market
concentration and the increase in concentration resulting from the
merger.""2
The post-merger HHI is calculated by squaring the sum of the
market shares of the merged firms and adding that number to the
individual squared market shares of the remaining firms in the
market." The merger-induced increase in concentration, however,
as measured by the HHI, can be calculated independently of the
total post-merger concentration by doubling the product of the
market shares of the merging firms. s4 Thus, as shown in an ex-
"1 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4503.10. In other comments, the Department
has stated that the HHI "gives a more accurate measure of market structure than the four-
firm concentration ratio"; although the four-firm concentration ratio would be the same
for two markets, one with four firms, each holding 15%, and 40 other firms holding 1%
each, and another market in which one firm held 57% and the remaining 43 firms held
only 1% each, the HHI for the two markets would be 940 and 3,292, respectively. Id.
4500, at 6881-2.
" Id. at 4503.10-4503.101.
$2 Id. at 4503.101.
,1 See id. at 4503.10 n.29.
14 Id. at 4503.10 n.30.
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ample provided in the 1982 Guidelines, for a merger of two firms
holding five and ten percent shares, the increase in concentration
as measured by the HHI would be 2(5x10) or 100.85
The Department generally will not challenge mergers in an un-
concentrated market."6 The Department announced, however, that
it "more likely than not" will challenge mergers increasing con-
centration more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated
market.8 7 Thus, mergers which increase concentration less than 100
points in moderately concentrated markets are likely to go un-
challenged. In a highly concentrated market, a resultant increase
of 100 points or more will likely precipitate a challenge, but a
merger producing an increase of less than fifty points probably will
go unchallenged."8
In deciding whether to challenge a merger in a moderately con-
centrated market or a highly concentrated market when the con-
centration increase is between fifty and 100 points, the Department
will consider not only the post-merger concentration and the con-
centration increase but also several subjective factors, including ease
of entry into the market, product differentiations, the probability
of collusion, and the conduct of firms in the market.89
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes totalling 1,000 and 1,800 points
roughly correspond to four-firm concentrations of fifty and seventy
percent. 90 Under the 1968 Guidelines, a merger in a highly con-
centrated market between two firms, each holding four percent
market shares, ordinarily would have been subject to challenge. 9'
Pursuant to the 1982 Guidelines, however, such a merger, resulting
in an HHI increase of thirty-two points,9" probably would not trig-
ger a Department challenge.93 Thus, although both guidelines
"Id.
Id. at 4503.101(a).
17 Id. at 4503.101(b).
" Id. at 4503.101(c).
" Id. at 11 4503.20B, 4503.20C, 4503.101(c).
10 Id. at 4503.10.
11 Justice Department Unveils, supra note 23, at 1253. Pursuant to the 1968
Guidelines, a highly concentrated market was one in which the four largest firms held ap-
proximately 75% or more of the total market share. Id. The 1968 Guidelines are set out
in relevant part at note 33 supra.
11 Justice Department Unveils, supra note 23, at 1253. Calculation of HHI increases
is discussed at text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
11 Justice Department Unveils, supra note 23, at 1253. In a highly concentrated
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similarly define a highly concentrated market, the 1982 Guidelines
appear to be "somewhat more permissive." 9
D. The Federal Reserve Board's Use of the HHI
The Federal Reserve Board (Board) recently began to use the
HHI, in conjunction with the four-firm concentration ratio, to
measure concentration in commercial banking markets.9 5 The
Board's use of the HHI initially appeared to be for the purpose
of familiarizing the commercial banking industry with the new
method of measurement, because the Board neither consistently
used it nor used it in a manner consistent with the 1982 Guidelines.
The HHI was first used in First Bancorp, Inc. 96 In the next ap-
propriate case, however, only Governor Teeters, who had dissented
in First Bancorp, measured concentration with the HHI.9 In Hart-
ford National Corp., the majority of the Board approved a
horizontal merger in an already highly concentrated market. The
merger resulted in increases in the four-firm concentration ratio
from 93.3 percent to 96.8 percent and in the HHI from 4,460 to
4,526, an increase of sixty-six points."9 Currently, however, the
market, the Department generally will not challenge a merger resulting in an HHI increase
of less than 50 points. 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4503.101(c).
" See Justice Department Unveils, supra note 23, at 1251.
, In a meeting held on Jan. 27, 1982, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board pro-
posed a policy statement for measuring the competitive effects of bank market-extension
acquisitions. Statement of Policy on Bank Acquisitions, 47 Fed. Reg. 9017 (1982) (pro-
posed Jan. 27, 1982); Hawke, Fed Competition Regs May Make Acquisitions Easier, Legal
Times of Wash., Feb. 8, 1982, at 12, col. 1. That statement suggested continued reliance
upon the 1968 Guidelines, which used the four-firm concentration ratio, for evaluations
of horizontal mergers. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9017. The staff recognized at the time of issuing
the proposed statement, however, that the Justice Department was then in the process of
reformulating its merger guidelines. Id.; Carlson, Justice Merger Guidelines Will Influence
Feds, Legal Times of Wash., June 21, 1982, at 4, col. 1. The statement has not yet been
approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See, e.g., General
Bancshares Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 802, 803 n.6 (1983).
68 Fed. Res. Bull. 769 (1982).
" See Hartford Nat'l Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 32, 33 (1983).
" Id. The Board held that since relevant state law prohibited commercial bank branch-
ing into the city of Waterbury and divestiture of certain assets by the acquiring holding
company to another bank located outside the city (but serving the Waterbury market),
thereby allowing continued representation in that city by four, rather than three banks,
the merger would actually facilitate more effective competitive efforts by the bank acquir-
ing the divested assets. Thus, the Board found that the merger would not adversely affect
existing competition. Id. at 32, 33. See text accompanying note 89 supra for a list of fac-
tors other than concentration increase considered in deciding whether to challenge a merger.
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Board regularly refers to the 1982 Guidelines when analyzing the
competitive effects of proposed mergers. 99
II. DEFINING PRODUCT MARKETS PURSUANT TO THE NEW
GUIDELINES
Both the 1968 Guidelines and the 1982 Guidelines begin with
the same principle of economic theory: market structure affects
market conduct and ultimately affects market performance. The
1968 Guidelines focus on market structure;'°0 the 1982 Guidelines
focus more specifically on inhibiting the creation or enhancement
of market power through mergers.' In addition, the 1982
Guidelines emphasize the use of economic evidence to show that
a merger, unless challenged, will result in actual or potential harm
to competition.' 0
2
Definition of the relevant market is generally the major issue
in any merger challenge.'03 Thus, how the product market is defined
is crucial to a proper result.'0I The 1968 Guidelines took a general
approach to product market definition." 5 Those guidelines sought
to define a line of commerce "distinguishable as a matter of com-
mercial practice" from other products which, although reasonably
interchangeable, were not perfectly interchangeable with the sub-
ject product in terms of price, quality, and use.'0 6
"9 See, e.g., Comerica Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 797, 798 & n.4 (1983); Pennbancorp,
69 Fed. Res. Bull. 548, 551 & n.23 (1983); Fidelcor, Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 445, 446 &
n.5 (1983); InterFirst Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 383, 385 & n.7 (1983).
10 See 1968 Guidelines, supra note 22, 4510(2), at 6882.
101 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4501; Werden, supra note 60, at 516 & n.8.
102 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, 4500, at 6881-2.
,o' E. KINTNER, AN ANTrTRusT PRMMR 92 (2d ed. 1973).
204 See id. at 92-93. The relevant market comprises both a "product" and a
"geographic" market. Although both must be delineated to define an antitrust market,
the 1982 Guidelines follow the traditional approach by defining each separately. Werden,
supra note 60, at 552-53. Moreover, pursuant to the 1982 Guidelines, the product market
is defined first, then the geographic market is established for that product. Id. at 553. For
a discussion of the pitfalls resulting from delineating a product market while ignoring the
geographic market, see id. at 553-55.
to, See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, 4500, at 6881-2.
206 1968 Guidelines, supra note 22, 4510(2), at 6882. Judge Posner criticized this
formulation stating: "I find untenable the notion ... that only producers of perfect
substitutes must be included in the market." R. POSNER, supra note 31, at 131 (emphasis
in original). Posner declared that it would be better to include " 'good' substitutes" in the
market and treat products as outside that market only if they are "substantially different
in design, physical composition, and other technical characteristics." Id. at 131-32.
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The goal of the product market definition techniques in the
1982 Guidelines, however, is to include in the market all firms
which, through the exercise of market power, could raise and keep
the prices of the subject products' 7 above their competitive
levels. 08 Thus, although the Department admits that the result of
its use of the 1982 Guidelines may be to allow the consummation
of some horizontal mergers which would have been previously
challenged,' °0 the relevant product market "will include.., those
products that the merging firm's customers view as good substitutes
at prevailing prices."" 0
The 1982 Guidelines, therefore, set a standard for defining the
relevant product market:' "[T]he Department seeks to identify
a group of products such that a hypothetical firm that was the only
present and future seller of those products could raise price
profitably.""'  To test this standard the Department will
hypothesize a five percent increase in the firm's prices," 3 assum-
107 The 1982 Guidelines define "products" as including products and services. 1982
Guidelines, supra note 4, 4502, at 6881-2.
1*1 Id., 4500, at 6881-3. See Werden, supra note 60, at 516-17 & nn.8 & 9. For fur-
ther discussion of differences between the 1968 Guidelines and the 1982 Guidelines regard-
ing delineation of relevant markets, see id. at 570-72.
10o 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, 4500, at 6881-2. Changes in Justice Department
enforcement policies evident in its 1982 Guidelines include the requirement of showing
economic evidence of actual or potential harm to competition. These changes reflect not
only trends in judicial decisions and Justice Department enforcement actions since 1968,
but also changes in emphasis by the Reagan Administration. Id.
110 Id. 4502, at 6881-8 & n.9 (emphasis added). See generally Werden, supra note
60, at 524-35. It appears that Judge Posner's views were at least partially, if not completely,
adopted by the authors of the 1982 Guidelines.
I The 1982 Guidelines set forth the Department's enforcement policy concerning ac-
quisitions and mergers subject to the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)), and the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat.
209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4,
at 4501. In addition, the 1982 Guidelines reflect congressional intent that "merger en-
forcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency." Id. Those guidelines,
however, are not binding on the Department. The Department reserved the right not to
remove the exercise of its judgment from the evaluation of mergers under the antitrust laws.
Id. Finally, the 1982 Guidelines are only a business planning device in that the provisions
of the guidelines merely indicate when and under what circumstances the Department is
likely to challenge a merger, and "not how it will conduct the litigation of cases that it
decides to bring." Id.
... Id. at 4502.10.
"' The "Department will define and measure the market for each product or service
.. . of each of the merging firms." Id. 4502, at 6881-7 (emphasis added).
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ing that customers will shift to reasonable and available substitutes,
and will "ask how many buyers would be likely to shift to other
products within one year." " The Department will then add to the
market those products to which a "significant percentage" of
buyers would likely shift." 5 The product market will be expanded
until the profitability standard is met. 16
Methods used for defining relevant product markets prior to
the 1982 Guidelines were the offspring of "a lot of seat-of-the-pants
feelings.""' While this new approach will encourage both the
Department and the private sector to look harder for econometric
evidence to support their conclusions regarding market definition," 8
the provisional mapping of the market through hypothetical five
percent price increases is a proper starting point for determining
whether market power could be exercised in a given market." 9
Stated differently, this provisional mapping method could be
viewed as a "foiling standard." If a firm can be "foiled" in its
efforts to raise prices, then the market has been defined too nar-
rowly and the "foilers" must be brought into the market
definition. 20 This form of mapping continues "until you've got
a group that can't be foiled."'1
2'
Product substitutability will be evaluated by the Department
using any relevant evidence in combination with the following
criteria: (1) buyers' and sellers' perceptions of substitutability; and
(2) similarities or differences between the products in usage, design,
physical composition, and price movements. 122
"4 Id. at 4502.10.
"5 Id.
126 Id.
1, See Antitrust Division's Chief Economist Defends Value of New Merger Guidelines,
[Jan.-June] ANrrIRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at 1302 (June 24, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Chief Economist].
"I Id. at 1304. One practitioner, in criticism, referred to the 1982 Guidelines as the
" 'The Economists' Relief Act of 1982.' "See Antitrust Practitioners React Favorably to
New Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June] ArmtusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at
1317 (June 24, 1982) (comment of Mr. Ronald Dolan).
"I Chief Economist, supra note 117, at 1302. See text accompanying notes 113-16
supra.
220 Chief Economist, supra note 117, at 1303.
121 Id.
2 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.10. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (practical indicia). The evidence necessary to conduct this
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Once the relevant market is defined, the Department will
calculate market shares. Although the Department normally will
use the total sales or capacity of all firms identified as falling within
the market's boundaries,'23 it also recognizes that the competitive
significance of a firm may be overstated by such calculations.' 2
Thus, in appropriate cases the Department will include only that
amount of sales or capacity likely to be made or used in the
geographic market. 25 Similarly, the Department may reduce the
market share of a firm whose capacity "may be so committed
elsewhere that it would not be available to respond to an increase
in price in the market.'
' 26
III. CASE LAW STANDARDS FOR DEFINING PRODUCT MARKETS
A. Applicable Law
1. Clayton Act
In 1914, Congress responded to public pressure to protect small
competitors from the menace of unrestrained corporate growth,
stemming from the failures of the Sherman Act, by enacting the
Clayton Act.127 The Clayton Act' 2' proscribes anticompetitive trade
practices, including price discrimination, 129 exclusive dealing and
tying arrangements,' 30 and certain interlocking directorates. 13'
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 132 the provision with the greatest
relevance to this discussion of competition in the banking context,
evaluation may be difficult to obtain, if it exists at all. Werden, supra note 60, at 565-66.
Furthermore, the results of such an evaluation should be viewed with a fair amount of skep-
ticism, because such evidence is difficult to interpret meaningfully. Id.




127 KINTN-M-MERGERS, supra note 2, at 154. For additional discussion of the Clayton
Act, see Note, Banking Mergers and "Line of Commerce" After the Monetary Control
Act. A Submarket Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 731, 736.
,2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 13.
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 14.
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 19.
.32 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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was designed to thwart economic concentration in its incipiency. 33
Section 7 proscribes mergers substantially tending to lessen com-
petition or create a monopoly. 34 Thus, rather than prove actual
anticompetitive effect, the section 7 plaintiff must only show that
consummation of a merger will raise a substantial probability of
an anticompetitive effect.'
35
2. Bank Merger Act
Because of lessons learned in the aftermath of numerous bank
failures during the Great Depression, the banking industry is heavily
regulated. 3 " The primary federal statute applicable to mergers in
the banking industry is the Bank Merger Act. 37 That act requires
that banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) receive the written approval of their responsible regulatory
"I3 KINTNER-MERGERS, supra note 2, at 154. Section 7 provides, in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or .. . the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in'any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18.
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963), the Supreme
Court read together the stock and asset acquisition portions and held that § 7, as amended
in 1950, applied to bank mergers. KINTNER-MERGERS, supra note 2, at 421; Note, supra
note 127, at 736 n.35.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
1S See KINTNER-MERGERS, supra note 2, at 154-55.
136 Id. at 412. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982) (creation and administration
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). See also 112 CONG. REC. 2440, 2446 (1966)
("Banking services, furnishing the very lifeblood of the economy of any community, stand
on a somewhat different footing from other forms of economic activity.") (statement of
Rep. Ashley concerning the purpose of the then proposed Bank Merger Act of 1966).
1' 12 U.S.C. § 1828. The Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850,
generally regulates acquisitions by and mergers between bank holding companies. The Act
provides, inter alia, that an acquisition by a holding company must be approved by the
Board prior to consummation of the transaction. The Board must advise the Comptroller
of the Currency if either bank is a national banking association, or its appropriate state
agency if either bank is a state bank, and consider the recommendation of the appropriate
agency. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b). See generally P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK
HOLDING CoMPANY LAW (1976).
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agency before consummating a proposed merger.' 38 The petitioned
agency may not approve any merger resulting in a monopoly or
raising a substantial probability of lessened competition or a
restraint of trade,'3 9 unless the probable anticompetitive effects are
clearly outweighed by the merger's benefits to the community to
be served.
40
The responsible agency, however, must notify the Attorney
General if a merger has been approved.' 4' The Department then
has thirty days to challenge the merger under the antitrust laws.
4 2
In the event that an antitrust action ensues, federal regulatory ap-
proval is automatically stayed pending the outcome of the judicial
proceedings, unless the presiding district court orders otherwise.' 3
Furthermore, although it must conduct a de novo review,' the
reviewing court must apply the same competitive effects standards
applied by the approving agency."'
"' See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2). The responsible agency may be the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), depending upon whether the acquiring or resulting bank
is a national bank, a state member bank, or an insured nonmember bank. Id.
19 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5). The Bank Merger Act's proscription of monopolization,
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A), is taken from § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. County
Nat'l Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); H.R.
REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1860,
1862.
The "substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" language
of 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) is quoted from § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The
"restraint of trade" language in 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) is taken directly from § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171,
181-82 (1968); County Nat'l Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d at 1256.
M4 Those legislators favoring the exemption of the banking industry from the antitrust
laws were partially appeased by the Bank Merger Act's provisions ensuring both regulatory
agency review, and judicial recognition of the need to consider "competitive factors," in-
cluding the "convenience and needs of the community to be served." 112 CoNG. REc. 2440,
2441 (1966) (statement of Rep. Patman).
"1 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (Bank Holding
Company Act).
,42 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6), (7)(A) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (Bank
Holding Company Act). Under both statutes, the "antitrust laws" include the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(8) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(f)
(Bank Holding Company Act).
'4 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (Bank Holding
Company Act).
14 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (Bank Holding
Company Act).
"1 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(B) (Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (Bank Holding
Company Act).
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It is quite clear that federal antitrust laws are to be applied by
the regulatory agencies and reviewing courts when considering pro-
posed mergers in the banking industry.'46 Although at least two
federal district courts have suggested that the competitive effects
standards of the Bank Merger Act are less stringent than the an-
titrust standards established by the Sherman and Clayton Acts,'
47
the legislative history,' 8 the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Act,' 49 and other cases 150 compel the conclusion that Congress in-
corporated the antitrust principles of the Sherman Act and section
7 of the Clayton Act into the Bank Merger Act. Because the
regulatory agencies and reviewing courts must apply conventional
1'6 This was not the case prior to the amendments of the Bank Merger Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1966. Prior to the amendments, both acts provided that
competition was only one of the several factors to be considered by the agencies in their
review of proposed transactons, and Congress was reluctant to apply § 7 of the Clayton
Act to bank mergers. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1959); 106
CoNG. REc. 9711 ("Section 7 of the Clayton Act should continue to be inapplicable to bank
mergers.") (remarks of Sen. Fulbright). The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions holding
that the antitrust laws do apply to the banking industry, and that the public interest could
not be considered in the antitrust analysis, precipitated the 1966 amendments to the federal
banking legislation. 112 CoNG. REc. 2653 (1966) (The amendments "will end the confu-
sion and controversy which has surrounded the bank merger situation since the ill-advised
and unfortunate decisions of the Supreme Court in the Philadelphia and Lexington cases.")
(statement of Sen. Robertson). See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lex-
ington, 376 U.S. 665, 668-73 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 352-55 (1963).
' See United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1, 20-22 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 142-44 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
'' See 112 CoNcG. REc. 2441 ("This bill, in contrast [to the Bank Merger Act of 1960],
makes the competitive factor preeminent. And the competitive standard to be applied is
clearly that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.") (statement of Rep. Patman, Chairman
of Comm. on Banking and Currency); Id. at 2444 ("[T]he antitrust standards which have
been developed on the basis of these statutory definitions [in the Clayton and Sherman Acts]
are to be incorporated in the application of the proposed act.") (statement of Rep. Reuss);
Id. at 2451 ("It should also be clear.., that the competitive standard to be used is drawn
directly from Clayton Act section 7 and Sherman Act section I.") (remarks of Rep. Minish).
141 See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. at 182 ("Only one conclusion can
be drawn from the exhaustive legislative deliberations that preceded passage of the [Bank
Merger] Act: Congress intended bank mergers first to be subject to the usual antitrust
analysis .... "). See also United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 364 (1967).
"' See, e.g., Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
649 F.2d 1026, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981) (Board may not prohibit proposed acquisition on com-
petitive grounds under Bank Holding Company Act unless it concludes the antitrust stan-
dards contained in that Act have been violated); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Gover-
nors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (same holding);
Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1973) (similar holding
under Bank Merger Act).
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antitrust analysis to a proposed bank merger, the threshold step
for both tribunals is to define the relevant product market in ac-
cordance with principles developed in antitrust cases arising under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts.
B. Supreme Court: Defining Product Market in
Nonbanking Cases
The Supreme Court has defined the relevant product market
in a number of nonbanking cases' 51 for actions pursuant to pro-
visions of both the Sherman Act'52 and the Clayton Act.'53 In
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,' 5" Justice Reed,
writing for a plurality, stated that, at least for Sherman Act sec-
tion 2 purposes, the tests for defining a relevant product market
are constant:' 5 the "market is composed of products that have
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced-price, use and qualities considered."' 5 6 Thus, substitute
products having a high degree of "functional interchangeability,"'"
without requiring fungibility,' 58 and with a high cross-elasticity of
demand'59 should be included in the relevant product market con-
sidered in determining whether a firm exercised monopoly power'60
over that market. 
6'
"' For a recent discussion of these cases, see Note, supra note 127, at 744-46.
-52 15 U.S.C. § 2.
'S3 15 U.S.C. § 18.
." 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (The Government charged that duPont had monopolized in-
terstate commerce in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act by producing almost 75% of the
cellophane sold in the U.S.).
" Id. at 395-96.
116 Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
Id. at 399.
, ' Id. at 394.
'" Id. at 400. Cross-elasticity of demand has been defined as the percentage change
in quantity demanded of product X for a small change in the price of product Y, when
all other things, such as quality, remain equal. E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 56.
60 The duPont Court defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or
exclude competition." 351 U.S. at 391.
6I At least one commentator agreed with the Court that reasonable interchangeability,
a multivariable test, rather than just cross-elasticity of demand, a price test, was the proper
method for determining the scope of the relevant product market. See E. SINGER, supra
note 34, at 56. According to Dr. Singer, cross-elasticity of demand alone is not an equivalent
to competition. Id. at 58-59. Judge Posner, however, has contended that the importance
attached by courts to market definition reflected "the law's failure to have developed a
[Vol. 72
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Less than a year later, in a separate action, the Supreme Court
found that duPont had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by
acquiring a substantial portion of General Motors common
stock.'62 Although this was a vertical acquisition case, the Court
had to define the relevant product market in order to find that the
acquisition's effect may have "substantially lessen[ed] competition
• . .or tend[ed] to create a monopoly" of "any line of
commerce."' 63 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan found
that automotive finishes and fabrics, as opposed to a grouping of
all finishes and fabrics, composed the relevant product market
because the "peculiar characteristics" of those automotive products
rendered them "sufficiently distinct" to make them a "line of
commerce." 64
genuinely economic approach to the problem of monopoly." R. POSNER, supra note 31,
at 125. He further asserted that elasticity of demand, if known, would make market defini-
tion redundant. Id.
Alternatively, Judge Posner would use a "good substitutes" test. If the courts are
unable to determine reasonable interchangeability at the competitive price of the product
(i.e., the cross-elasticity of demand), then those courts must "assume that products whose
design, physical composition, and other technical characteristics are substantially different
are not good substitutes." Id. at 128.
Despite their differences, which do not appear to be great, both Dr. Singer and Judge
Posner disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that cellophane exhibited a high cross-
elasticity of demand. See R. PosNER, supra note 31, at 128; E. SINGER, supra note 34, at
57-58. Cf. 351 U.S. at 416-18 (maintaining that cellophane had a low cross-elasticity of
demand because, while it had a higher price than its substitutes, producers of these other
materials failed to respond to duPont's reductions of the price of cellophane) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting). According to Judge Posner, applying the interchangeability test at the current
and not the competitive price level of cellophane resulted in a product market defined to
include even poor substitutes, rather than products which were reasonably interchangeable,
because "at a high enough price even poor substitutes look good to the consumer." R.
POSNER, supra note 31, at 128.
According to Dr. Singer, who stated his viewpoint somewhat differently than Judge
Posner, it was inaccurate for the duPont Court to conclude that a high cross-elasticity ex-
isted at cellophane prices which resulted in unnaturally high profits when cross-elasticity
may actually have been quite low if it had been measured at a competitive price. There
are two reasons for Dr. Singer's conclusion: (1) the assumption that "other things remain
equal" is implicit to the main consideration in cross-elasticity of demand-that price change
in one product results in a corresponding change in demand for another product; and (2)
cross-elasticity varies with price. See E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 58.
"' See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
i63 See id. The Court stated that "[s]ubstantiality can be determined only in terms
of the market affected." Id. at 593.
I Id. at 593-94.
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In the subsequent case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,65
the Court combined the "reasonable interchangeability" and
"peculiar characteristics" tests in a single setting. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Brown Shoe majority, stated that although
the outer boundaries of a product market would be "determined
by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity
of demand" between the product and its substitutes, the boundaries
of the individual submarkets within this broad product market,
each alone constituting a product market for antitrust purposes,
would be determined by practical indicia, including: peculiar
characteristics and uses of the product; public and industry recogni-
tion of each submarket as an economic entity; distinct customers
and prices; and sensitivity to price changes.'
66
In United States v. Continental Can Co.,' 61 the Supreme Court
elaborated upon the applicability of its Brown Shoe market-
submarket tests. The Government had challenged the merger of
a metal can producer' 68 and a glass jar manufacturer'69 and sought
divestiture pursuant to the Clayton Act.' 7 The district court
dismissed the Government's complaint, finding that the Govern-
ment had failed to prove reasonable probability of anticompetitive
effect in any line of commerce.' 7 ' The Government had urged the
district court to recognize that although the metal and glass con-
tainer industries were distinct lines of commerce, the end uses for
such containers comprised other lines of commerce evidenced by
.65 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
"I Id. at 325. See also KINTNER-MERGERS, supra note 2, at 227 ("the courts have
been reluctant to recognize anything but narrow submarkets").
Commenting on Brown Shoe, Judge Posner stated that a submarket approach is un-
sound "[i]f the 'outer boundaries' of the market include only the product's good substitutes
... then a submarket would be a group of sellers from which sellers of good substitutes
... had been excluded, and these exclusions would deprive any market-share statistics of
their economic significance." R. POSNER, supra note 31, at 129.
367 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
"6 Continental Can occupied a dominant position in the metal can industry. The com-
pany shipped 33% of all metal cans and accounted for 31.4% of the metal can industry's
total sales. Id. at 458-59.
M Hazel-Atlas was the third largest glass container manufacturer, accounting for 9.6%
of the total market share in an industry in which the three largest manufacturers held 55.4%
of the total market share. Id. at 460.'
110 Id. at 443-44.
'" Id. at 444. See also 15 U.S.C. § 18.
[Vol. 72
HORIZONTAL MERGERS
strong interindustry competition; since, for example, both glass and
metal containers were used in the beer, soft drink, cosmetic, health
and chemical industries. 72 The district court declined to find, with
the exception of the beer container industry, that existing interin-
dustry competition had resulted in product submarkets delineated
by end use. 173
Following the duPont guidelines that substitutes need not be
fungible to be included in the relevant product market,"'7 the
Supreme Court in Continental Can rejected the district court's con-
clusions as unduly restrictive.17 1 First, the Court noted that cer-
tain characteristics prevented the metal and glass containler in-
dustries from being a single line of commerce. The Court recog-
nized that the differing physical characteristics of metal and glass
containers and the necessity of different machinery for packing in
glass or metal containers prevented fungibility in all end uses.
17 6
Nevertheless, the Court stated, the trial court record reflected in-
tense end use competition between metal and glass containers.
77
Justice White, writing for the majority, further noted that both
industries had attempted to expand their respective market shares
at the expense of each other.'" The Court then held that although
interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand were still
the tests to be applied in defining the relevant product market in
an interindustry merger, the interchangeability need "not be so
complete and the cross-elasticity of demand not so immediate as
in the case of most intra-industry mergers."' 79 The Court also held
that price was "only one factor in a user's choice between one con-
tainer or the other."'' 0 The packager's use of glass or metal
ultimately would depend upon the consumers' preferences, and
although that may not be price competition, it was "nevertheless
7 378 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 448.
,' Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
at 394). See text accompanying notes 154-61 supra.
"I See 378 U.S. at 449. The Court stated that they "must recognize meaningful com-








meaningful competition between interchangeable containers." ' 81
Thus, the Court concluded that although the glass and metal con-
tainers were two separate lines of commerce, the interindustry com-
petition between those two lines gave rise to submarkets'8" "which,
in themselves, constitute[d] product markets for antitrust
purposes."' 83
The Supreme Court again applied the duPont reasonable in-
terchangeability test'84 when it held that the Grinnell Corporation
and its affiliated subsidiaries had monopolized the accredited cen-
tral station protective service nationwide, in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act.' 5 The Court recognized that in section 2
cases, as in Clayton Act section 7 cases, "there may be submarkets
that are separate economic entities."" 6 The Court rejected the no-
tion of submarkets as irrelevant to this case, however, and instead
found the relevant product market to be confined to accredited cen-
tral station protective services. '87 The Court asserted two reasons
for its product market definition: first, because the accredited cen-
tral station service was unique and provided a single basic service,
the protection of property, it reflected commercial realities to group
the individual services performed by such stations into a single
"part of the trade or commerce" as the relevant product market,
rather than to evaluate the price control or competitive effects of
"' Id. at 456.
352 The Court held that "[w]here the area of effective competition cuts across industry
lines, so must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate determination of the
merger's true impact cannot be made." Id. at 457.
" Id. at 458 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 325). The Court
further held that "[t]here may be some end uses for which glass and metal do not and could
not compete, but complete interindustry competitive overlap need not be shown." Id. at
457 (emphasis added).
" See text accompanying notes 154-61 supra.
'* United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966). See also E. SiNrER, supra
note 34, at 61-62.
116 384 U.S. at 572. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 325 (citing
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95). The Court fur-
ther asserted that in defining the relevant product market, there was "no reason to dif-
ferentiate between 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and 'part' of com-
merce for purposes of the Sherman Act." 384 U.S: at 573 (citing United States v. First
Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. at 667-68). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18. In First Nat'l Bank, the Court
adopted commercial banking, the product market for purposes of the Clayton Act, as the
product market for determining the Sherman Act § 1 issue in that case. 376 U.S. at 667.
"' 384 U.S. at 572.
[Vol. 72
1983-84] HORIZONTAL IERGEiS
each individual service as a separate submarket;' 88 and second,
unlike Brown Shoe, the relevant product market in Grinnell was
composed of services and not products."1 9
The Grinnell Court admitted there were substitutes for ac-
credited central station services and that those substitutes, through
fringe competition, prevented the defendants from exercising
"unfettered power to control the price" of their accredited cen-
tral station services.' 90 Nevertheless, the Court refused to include
those substitutes in the relevant product market or to evaluate their
effects as submarkets of those individual services performed by cen-
tral stations, because "none of them appear[ed] to operate on the
same level as the central station service so as to meet the inter-
changeability test of the duPont case."'' The Court further stated
that because of their marked differences with central station ser-
vices, local alarm systems did not have "the low degree of differen-
tiation required of substitute services as well as substitute
articles.'" 92
US Id. at 572-73. The Court noted that like commercial banking, which comprised
a cluster of services, the relevant product market in Grinnell, the accredited central sta-
tion service, also comprised a cluster of services. Id. at 573 (citing United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356).
The Court's definition of the product market as a cluster of services resulted from
the following line of analysis: Central station protective services offered a wide range of
separate services; local uncentralized protective services offered fewer of those separate ser-
vices, and thus, did not meet the low level of product or service differentiation required
to pass the duPont reasonable interchangeability test; the breadth of the range of services
offered by central station services made them unique; and, to compete effectively, central
station services had to offer all or nearly all of the several separate services. Thus, because
all of the separate services served a single use, the protection of property, and because the
grouping of many services was required for effective competition and resulted in a unique
service, it made commercial sense to define the product market as the cluster of those ser-
vices. Id. at 572-74.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
twice emphasized that the insurance industry recognized accredited central station protec-
tive services as distinct from all other types of protective services by noting that insurance
underwriters required lower premiums than those businesses using central station services.
Id. at 567, 574. The Court did leave an open door to rebuttal of its cluster definition,
however, stating that the Grinnell defendants simply had "not made out a case for fragmen-
tizing the types of services into lesser units." Id. at 572.
", Id. The Court did not explain this distinction.
290 Id. at 573-74 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 254
(D.R.I. 1964)).
"I Id. at 573.
19" Id.
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C. Supreme Court: Defining Product Market
in Banking Cases
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to define
the tests for the relevant product market in bank merger cases oc-
curred almost ten years ago.'93 Only two other Supreme Court cases
have dealt with the situation.'94 These three cases, discussed below
in very abbreviated form, ,95 met immediate and continuing criticism
from legal scholars.' 96 The lower federal courts which have con-
fronted the issue, 97 and the Federal Reserve Board, continue to
, See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
"' See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 321.
05 For a more extensive discussion of these cases, see Note, supra note 127, at 746-52.
9 See, e.g., Bleier & Eisenbeis, Commercial Banking as the "Line of Commerce"
and the Role of Thrifts, 98 BANKING L.J. 374, 375-78 (1981); Cairns, Retail and Wholesale
Banking: Diverging Markets and Lines of Commerce, 32 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 713, 733-34
(1981); Friedlander & Slayton, Determination of the Relevant Product Market in Bank
Mergers: A Time for Reassessment?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1537, 1538-40 (1981); Note, supra note
127, at 746-52.
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D. Idaho
1970) (rejected "clustering" products and services of commercial banks in a single line of
commerce and asserted that competitive effects analysis should be conducted for those sub-
product markets exhibiting cross-elasticities of demand between commercial banks, thrifts
and other financial institutions (such as interest-bearing deposits, agricultural production
loans, farm real estate loans, residential and commercial real estate loans, student loans,
automobile and other consumer loans)); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp.
157, 168 (D. Md. 1970) (commercial banking was the line of commerce but court "con-
sidered" activities of nonbanking financial institutions) (dictum); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1180-81 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (meaningful competition existed be-
tween commercial banks and various nonbanking institutions such as savings and loans,
land bank association, finance companies, and cotton market financing association and
corporation, indicating existence of reasonable interchangeability between them; court con-
cluded that all should be included in the same line of commerce) (dictum); United States
v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. at 7-11 (mutual savings banks and savings and loans
offered direct and meaningful competition for savings dollars and mortgage loans; thus
the line of commerce was divided between wholesale and retail accounts); United States
v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. at 154-64 (presence of nonbanking financial
institutions such as savings and loans, General Motors Acceptance Corp., finance com-
panies, credit unions and insurance companies should be considered when estimating com-
petitive effects of a merger; the court "shaded" concentration ratios to reflect those com-
petitive effects); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867,
895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (rejected Brown Shoe-type subproduct market analysis based upon
"practical indicia," but adopted analysis based upon two other court-perceived subproduct
markets: wholesale and retail accounts).
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA)
expanded thrift powers into areas which previously were within the exclusive province of
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follow the letter of the Supreme Court's decisions, but have on oc-
casion circumvented those aspects considered to be economically
unrealistic.'98 The Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC,
however, have chosen on occasion to ignore the Supreme Court's
definition of the relevant product market and have included thrifts
in the relevant product market when they found them to be direct
competitors of commercial banks.' 99
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,"' the Supreme
Court concluded that the "cluster of products ...and services
commercial banks and promoted limited parity between thrifts and commercial banks. See
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). For example, pursuant to the MCA all federally
insured depository institutions may offer NOW accounts for personal checking and not-
for-profit customers. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832a (1982). Thus, thrifts and commercial banks
have attained parity on the retail side of this significant individual product market. In ad-
dition, federally chartered savings and loan associations may now commit 20% of their
assets to consumer loans, commercial paper, commercial real estate loans, and corporate
debt securities. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B) (1982). Furthermore, not only may those same
savings and loans now offer credit card and trust services, but the MCA also liberalized
standards pertaining to their investment opportunities by allowing investments in certain
open ended investment companies. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(4), (c)(1). Also pursuant to the
MCA, federal mutual savings banks may commit five percent of their assets to commer-
cial, corporate, and business loans to borrowers within the same state or within 75 miles
of the home office of the lending bank. McNeill, The Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 444, 450 (1980). Additionally,
those savings banks may accept commercial demand deposits from those businesses receiving
such commercial loans. Cairns, supra note 196, at 726-30 & n.73 (several savings and loans,
given their new commercial powers, have launched aggressive campaigns to lure customers
away from commercial banks, protraying themselves as capable of providing one-stop bank-
ing services); Friedlander & Slayton, supra note 196, at 1541-43. See also Note, supra note
127, at 757-58. But see United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp.
793, 800 (D.N.J. 1980) (refused to include thrifts in same line of commerce with commer-
cial banks, although it found competition in several subproduct markets, including demand
deposit and savings accounts, mortgage and home improvement loans, installment loans,
safe-deposit boxes, trust services, drive-in facilities, 24-hour cash dispensing, and travelers'
checks, because those thrifts were not yet actual or significant participants in the marketing
of bank services to locally limited wholesale or business accounts). But cf. Bleier & Eisenbeis,
supra note 196, at 382-83 (the MCA may not raise thrifts to a level of full competitiveness
with commercial banks).
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified in scattered sections throughout titles 11, 12, 15, 20, 22, 26 and 42 U.S.C.)
further expands and accelerates the deregulatory trend which began with the enactment of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Note, supra
note 127, at 758-60. For a list of the provisions of this Act, see [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
FED. BANK xN L. REp. (CCH) 99,318 (Oct. 8, 1982).
" See notes 218-25 infra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 226-31 infra and accompanying text.
200 374 U.S. at 321.
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... denoted by the term 'commercial banking,' . . compose[d]
a distinct line of commerce." 20' Although admitting that certain
nonbanking financial institutions competed with commercial banks
by offering similar products and services,202 the Court chose to set
apart commercial banking as a line of commerce distinct from those
other financial institutions for three reasons: (1) some commercial
bank products or services, for example, the checking account, were
found to be "so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective
competition from products or services of other financial institu-
tions"; (2) certain commercial bank products or services, for ex-
ample, loans, enjoyed cost advantages over similar products and
services offered by nonbanking financial institutions because those
nonbanking institutions depended upon commercial bank loans for
at least part of their working capital; and (3) certain other prod-
ucts or services, for example, savings deposits, enjoyed "a settled
consumer preference, insulating them, to a marked degree, from
competition."
2 0 3
In United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co.,
204 Justice Brennan, writing again for the majority, reaffirmed his
conclusion in Philadelphia National Bank that commercial bank-
ing formed a distinct line of commerce. The Court rejected the
2"I Id. at 356. The Court listed banking products or various types of credit as including
"unsecured personal and business loans, mortgage loans, loans secured by securities or ac-
counts receivable, automobile installment and consumer goods installment loans, tuition
financing, bank credit cards, [and] revolving credit funds." Id. at 326 n.5.
Included in the Court's list of banking services were "acceptance of demand deposits
from individuals, corporations, governmental agencies, and other banks; acceptance of time
and savings deposits; estate and trust planning and trusteeship services; lock boxes and safety-
deposit boxes; account reconciliation services; foreign department services (acceptances and
letters of credit); correspondent services; [and] investment advice." Id.
2 The Court listed the following credit-supplying nonbanking institutions as "more
or less" competitors of commercial banks: "mutual savings banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, credit unions, personal-finance companies, sales-finance companies, private
businessmen (through the furnishing of trade credit), factors, direct-lending government
agencies, the Post Office, Small Business Investment Corporations, [and] life insurance com-
panies." Id. at 327 n.5.
203 Id. at 356-57. One witness testifying before the trial court, perplexed by the con-
sumer preference shown commercial banks despite payment of higher interest rates on savings
deposits by certain thrifts, stated: "Habit, custom, personal relationships, convenience, doing
all your banking under one roof appear to be factors superior to changes in the interest
rate level." Id. at 357 n.34.
204 399 U.S. at 350.
1983-84] HORIZONTAL MERGERS
district court's use of subproduct market analysis2"5 on two
grounds: 2 6 (1) the broader line of commerce represented by the
clustering of banking products and services had economic
significance as a matter of trade reality because clustering facilitated
one-stop banking convenience for customers; 27 and (2) the failure
to analyze as a cluster would result in a dilution of concentration
ratios with the probable effect that customers of small banks and
residents of small towns would be deprived of antitrust
protection.208
1*1 Id. at 360. The district court had found that the small commercial banks in the
relevant geographic market more closely resembled thrifts than the commercial banks which
were the subject of the Philadelphia National Bank litigation. Thus, the district court felt
more comfortable analyzing the competitive aspects of the contested merger along subproduct
market lines. By doing so the district court hoped to separate "those products and services
where absence of competition may be significant from those in which competition from
many sources is so widespread that no question of significant diminution of competition
by the merger could be raised." Id. at 359-60 (quoting United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 650-51 (D.N.J. 1969)).
20 In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan suggested that the ma-
jority's rejection of the district court's subproduct market ignored the mitigating effect non-
banking financial institution competition had on the market power held by the relevant
commercial banks. Justice Harlan preferred the subproduct market analysis suggested by
the district court, particularly in light of the similarities between the small commercial banks
involved and thrifts. 399 U.S. at 379-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated:
[T]he Court's mode of analysis makes too much turn on the all-or-nothing
determination that the relevant product market either includes or does not
include products and services of savings and loan companies, and other com-
petition. A far better approach would be to recognize the fact that a pro-
duct or geographic market is at best an approximation-necessary to calculate
some percentage figures. In evaluating such figures, however, the Court should
not decide the case simply by the magnitude of the numbers alone-it should
give the appellees on remand an opportunity to demonstrate that the numbers
here significantly "overstate" the competitive effects of this merger because
of the approximate nature of the assumptions underlying the Court's defini-
tion of the relevant market.
Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
07 In rejecting the district court's subproduct method of analysis, the Court stated
that splitting of the cluster "would be clearly relevant... in analyzing the effect on com-
petition of a merger between a commercial bank and another type of financial institution.
But submarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a broader line of commerce that has
economic significance." Id. at 360 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at
326). Cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. at 456-57 (merger between metal
can and glass container producers, wherein the two containers were recognized as separate
lines of commerce, but where interindustry competition was sufficient to warrant treating
the combined industries as the relevant product market).
201 399 U.S. at 361.
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In United States v. Connecticut National Bank,"' the Court's
most recent consideration of the relevant product market defini-
tion in the context of a commercial bank horizontal merger, the
Court continued its adherence to its earlier conclusion that com-
mercial banking composed a distinct line of commerce.210 The
Court rejected the district court's findings that thrifts located in
the same geographic market as the two merging commercial banks
should be included in the same relevant product market as those
banks .21' The Court recognized that the thrifts had moved closer
to parity with commercial banks in several distinct product and ser-
vice submarkets and were imbued with limited state powers to make
commercial loans. 212 Nevertheless, the Court held that the cluster
of products represented by the term "commercial banking" re-
mained competitively distinct from all other financial institutions,
because those nonbanking financial institutions were not yet
"significant participants" in the commercial banking market.2"3
Stated differently, the Court found that the district court had
"overestimated the degree of competitive overlap" existing between
commercial banks and the nonbanking financial institutions.2"'
Thus, although nonbanking financial institutions competed with
commercial banks in several financial services submarkets, follow-
ing the standards promulgated in Phillipsburg, the Court in Con-
necticut National Bank held that commercial banking constituted
a distinct line of commerce, because commercial banks offered a
cluster of products and services which thrifts could not, "particular-
ly with regard to commercial customers. ' 2 '5 The Court, however,
left the door open to those seeking to modify its definition of the
relevant product market in commercial bank mergers. Recogniz-
ing that certain thrifts in Connecticut were approaching parity with
209 418 U.S. at 656.
210 Id. at 664.
211 Id. at 663-65.
212 Id. at 663 & n.3.
2I3 d. at 665-66. The Court based its assertion that thrifts doing business in the rele-
vant geographic market were not "significant participants" on evidence that commercial
banks "almost exclusively" controlled the commercial bank loan business in Connecticut.
At the close of 1971, Connecticut commercial banks held $1.03 billion in outstanding com-
mercial loans, while Connecticut thrifts held only $26 million in similar loans. Id. at 665.
1,4 Id. at 663.
21, Id. at 663-64 & n.3.
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commercial banks, the Court stated that at some future time it may
become economically unrealistic to distinguish thrifts from com-
mercial banks "for purposes of the Clayton Act." 2 ' The Court
suggested that the time might be reached when thrifts will become
"significant participants in the marketing of bank services to com-
mercial enterprises," but the facts as presented persuaded the Court
that thrifts had not yet reached that level of participation in the
commercial market.1 7
D. Regulatory Agencies: Defining Product
Market in Banking Cases
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
and the district courts have remained faithful to the edict of Con-
necticut National Bank.2I 8 To date, the Board has not found any
thrift to be such a "significant participant" in the offering of those
products and services composing the "cluster" distinct to commer-
cial banking that it would or could include it in the commercial
banking line of commerce.21 9 Nevertheless, through a not so sub-
tle evolutionary process, the Board has developed a technique for
mitigating220 those anticompetitive effects which result from a
226 Id. at 666.
227 Id. The Court stated:
We do not say . . . that in a case involving a merger of commercial banks
a court may never consider savings banks and commercial banks as operating
in the same line of commerce, no matter how similar their services and
economic behavior. At some stage in the development of savings banks it will
be unrealistic to distinguish them from commercial banks for purposes of the
Clayton Act.... mhat point may well be reached when and if savings banks
become significant participants in the marketing of bank services to commer-
cial enterprises.
Id. (emphasis added).
2I See note 197 supra for a discussion of post-Connecticut Nat' Bank cases in the
district courts.
229 See, e.g., First Bancorporation, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 769 (1982); Hartford Nat'l Corp.,
68 Fed. Res. Bull. 242 (1982); United Bank Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 358 (1981); Key Banks,
Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 781 (1980); Fidelity Union Bancorporation, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 576
(1980); First Bancorporation, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 967 (1978); Northeast Bancorporation, 60
Fed. Res. Bull. 375 (1974).
20 The concept of mitigating or shading the anticompetitive effects of a bank merger
arose in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 321. The Court stated:
We note three factors that cause us to shade the percentages given earlier in
this opinion, in seeking to calculate market share. (1) The percentages took
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merger b&tween commercial banks by considering in its antitrust
analysis the competitive impact generated by a substantial thrift22" '
presence in the relevant geographic market.
Currently, the Board looks at three general criteria when
deciding whether to exercise its discretion to shade 222 the market
shares resulting from a horizontal merger of commercial banks:
(1) the "absolute size"; (2) the "significant deposit-taking role";
and (3) the "expanded powers" of thrift institutions in the rele-
vant geographic market.223 Additionally, using a more specific test
in a very recent case, the Board stated it would give weight to the
competitive impact of thrifts on a commercial banking market
when thrifts "are among the largest depository institutions in the
market, control a substantial amount of the market's NOW or
other transaction accounts, have substantial commercial and non-
residential mortgage lending authority, and actively engage in the
business of commercial lending. ' 224 The Board is unlikely to shade,
no account of banks which do business in the four-county area but have no
offices there; ... (2) [t]he percentages took no account of banks which have
offices in the four-county area but not their home offices there; . . . [and]
(3) there are no percentages for the amount of business of banks located in
the area, other than appellees, which originates in the area.
Id. at 364 n.40.
Shading, according to the Philadelphia National Bank Court, did not require
mathematical precision:
No evidence was introduced as to the quantitative significance of these
three factors, and appellees do not contend that as a practical matter such
evidence could have been obtained. Under the circumstances, we think a
downward correction of the percentages to 30% produces a conservative
estimate of appellees' market share.
Id. The Court did not offer any further explanation of its method for deriving "a conserv-
ative estimate" of market share.
22 For purposes of shading, the Board has included only federal or state savings and
loan associations and mutual savings banks in its definition of thrifts. See, e.g., Fidelity
Union Bancorporation, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. at 577.
222 Shading takes "into consideration direct competition from thrifts in specific areas
when evaluating various competitive influences." United Bank Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull.
861, 862 (1981) (emphasis added). In effect, when evaluating the competitive effect thrifts
have in the relevant geographic market, the Board looks to those subproduct markets in
which thrifts and commercial banks directly compete.
223 Id.
224 First Bancorporation, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 770. In this case the Board noted that
several state mutual savings banks serving the relevant geographic market held nearly twice
the amount of deposits held by all nine commercial banks in the market. Id. at 770. The
Board further noted that those thrifts competed directly with commercial banks for say-
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however, if the merger eliminates substantial existing
competition."'
Other bank regulatory agencies have also included thrifts in
their competitive analysis of commercial bank mergers.226 For ex-
ings deposits, demand deposits and other transaction accounts, and consumer and mort-
gage loans. Id. In addition, the relevant thrifts had been granted authority by state law
to dedicate up to 15% of their total deposits to unsecured commercial and industrial loans
and to accept demand deposits from commercial customers. Id. at 770-71. Finally, the Board
noted that the two largest mutual savings banks were actively engaged in commercial lend-
ing activities. For example, those thrifts had established commercial lending departments,
hired commercial lending officers, were actively advertising the availability of commercial
loans, and had made a number of such loans. Id. at 771 & n.8. Despite these signs of
substantial direct competition the Board did not include the thrifts in the same line of com-
merce with the commercial banks because the total commercial loans held by the two largest
thrifts represented less than one percent of their total deposits. Id. at 771 n.9. Thus, although
the thrifts could not be included as significant participants in the commercial banking line
of commerce, the Board did consider their competitive impact when it shaded the market
shares held by the relevant commercial banks. As a result, the Board approved a merger
which might otherwise have been disapproved. Id. at 771.
In several more recent cases, the Board "has considered the presence of thrift institu-
tions" when assessing the competitive effects of proposed transactions. See, e.g., Com-
erica Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 797, 798-99 & nn.5-6, 8 (1983) (accorded "considerable weight"
to presence of 21 thrifts which held deposits of $7.4 billion, representing 25% of total
deposits, when approving merger resulting in an increase in HHI of 125 points and a post
merger HHI of 1,570 because those thrifts "exert a significant competitive influence");
Fidelcor, Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 445, 446 & n.6 (1983) (although commercial banking market
was unconcentrated, the Board noted that thrifts numbering 125 institutions, controlling
deposits representing 49.3% of total deposits, including those held by commercial banks,
providing NOW accounts, other transaction accounts, consumer loans and commercial loans
had been "considered").
22 See United Bank Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 61, 63 (1980). For other discussions
on Board treatment of thrifts in the competitive analysis of commercial bank mergers, see
Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 196, at 378-80; Cairns, supra note 191, at 732-33; Friedlander
& Slayton, supra note 196, at 1543-47; Note, supra note 127, at 755-56.
226 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has provided an interesting twist
for consideration. In its review of proposed mergers between savings and loans, that agency
considered commercial banks to be direct competitors for deposits; "commercial bank
deposits less than $100,000 are used in calculating market shares." Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra
note 196, at 381 n.15.
Several commentators have suggested that the banking regulatory agencies have all
but rejected commercial banking as a unique line of commerce. See, e.g., Bleier & Eisenbeis,
supra note 196, at 380-81 (both the Comptroller and the FDIC expanded the "line of com-
merce" in Maine where they have included thrift institutions as full competitors); Cairns,
supra note 196, at 732-33; Friedlander & Slayton, supra note 196, at 1547-48; Note, supra
note 127, at 755-56 n.147 (the Comptroller "has explicitly rejected the traditional defini-
tion of the 'line of commerce' for bank merger purposes") (citing Decision of the Comp-
troller of the Currency on the Application to Merge Merchants Nat'l Bank, Bangor, Me.,
into Northern Nat'l Bank, Presque Isle, Me., 8 n.12 (Dec. 12, 1980)).
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ample, in a recent decision the Comptroller of the Currency (Comp-
troller) included four mutual savings banks in its analysis of a
merger between two commercial banks in the Bangor, Maine
geographic market. 2" The Comptroller, however, adopted a uni-
que appoach. It neither suggested consideration of "all thrifts with
all commercial banks for all services in the same markets," nor
did it merely shade the percentage market shares of the merging
banks. 221 Instead, the Comptroller advocated a subproduct market
analysis. By analyzing competition for "precisely defined clusters
of products and services," or even specific products,229 the Comp-
troller hoped to "avoid an arbitrary increase in market participants
since it would simply redefine the market to include some or none
of the various financial institutions in the market.""23 In effect,
by using the more complex subproduct market analysis the Comp-
troller expected to reveal competition where it in fact existed, while
avoiding the arbitrariness of shading which might prevent discovery
of anticompetitive effects .23i
IV. APPLICATION OF THE 1982 GUIDELINES
TO COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS
The 1982 Guidelines are not binding on either the courts or the
Department. The courts may continue to follow those precedents
established in the case law.232 The Department has reserved the right
to exercise its judgment in lieu of strict adherence to its own
guidelines.233 Nevertheless, the 1982 Guidelines will have at least
an indirect effect on Department antitrust challenges to agency ap-
2 Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 226, at 5.
2, Id. at 8-9 n.12. See also Friedlander & Slayton, supra note 196, at 1547; Note,
supra note 127, at 756 n.147.
"I Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 226, at 9 n.12. See also Friedlander &
Slayton, supra note 196, at 1547.
230 Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 226, at 9 n.12.
23, See Friedlander & Slayton, supra note 196, at 1547-48. For listings of decisions
by the FDIC including thrifts in the competitive analysis of commercial bank mergers, see
Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 196, at 380 ri.14; Note, supra note 127, at 756 n.147.
232 "[Tihe Guidelines are designed primarily to indicate when the Department is likely
to challenge mergers. . . ." 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4501. The Guidelines are
not a regulatory expression of statutes. See id. at 4501 n.3 (the Guidelines are subject
to amendment in response to judicial decisions and evolving economic theory).
23 See note 111 supra.
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proved commercial bank mergers, because these guidelines embody
the procedures which will guide the Department in its merger en-
forcement policy.234 Thus, it is inevitable that the methods used
in that decision making process will find their way into actual litiga-
tion, perhaps through exhibits, testimony, or other offers of proof
of anticompetitive effects."'
A. Applicability of the 1982 Guidelines to
Commercial Bank Mergers
The Department intends to apply its 1982 Guidelines when
deciding whether to challenge acquisitions or mergers subject to
section 7 of the Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act.
236
In addition, those guidelines were written to ensure enforcement
of section 7 of the Clayton Act in a manner consistent with con-
gressional intent to interdict anticompetitive developments in their
incipiency, such as a merger exhibiting a substantial probability of
anticompetitive effect.237 Pursuant to the Bank Merger Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act, 23 mergers between insured commer-
cial banks and bank holding companies are subject to Department
challenge under the antitrust laws, including section 7 of the
Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 39 Thus, the 1982
Guidelines were written broadly enough to embrace commercial
bank mergers.
B. Impact of the 1982 Guidelines on Tests Developed
Through Antitrust Litigation
Pursuant to its 1982 Guidelines, when analyzing a bank merger,
the Department will first define a relevant market for each pro-
duct or service for which the merging firms compete.24 0 Commer-
234 Id.
21 The Department has stated, however, that the factors set forth in the Guidelines
"do not exhaust the range of evidence that the Department may introduce in court." 1982
Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.
236 Id.
27 Id.
23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828, 1841. See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
23 See notes 146-50 supra and accompanying text.




cial banks may be characterized as providing either commercial
banking services, where all financial services offered by such banks
are aggregated into a single line of commerce, or separate finan-
cial services."' Thus, the guidelines provide the Department with
the flexibility to conduct product market analysis by delineating
either a single market comprising a cluster of various financial ser-
vices or separate markets for each distinct service offered by the
merging banks.242
Second, the Department abandoned the "perfect substitutabil-
ity" requirement of its f968 Guidelines for defining the boundaries
of a relevant product market.243 Instead, the Department proposed
in its 1982 Guidelines that, as a first step in defining a relevant pro-
duct market, the Department would establish a provisional market
comprising those products or services constituting "good substitutes
at prevailing prices" for those products or services offered by the
merging firms to their consumers.2 44 The Department will deter-
mine product substitutability by following criteria reminiscent of
those practical indicia used by the Brown Shoe Court for deter-
mining submarket boundaries.2" ' The Department, therefore, ap-
parently recognizes that it is unable to determine the "reasonable
interchangeability" of a product at that product's competitive
price.246 Thus, rather than pursue the difficult task of defining the
relevant product market in terms of cross-elasticities,2 7 the Depart-
241 See generally Yesley, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining arguments for both
characterizations). See also Werden, supra note 60, at 527, 531 & nn.50, 63-64.
242 However, the Guidelines specify that "unless it is convinced that independent com-
petitive concerns exist in a larger market," the Department will adopt the smallest market
meeting its criteria. 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, 4502.10, at 6881-8 n.1l. See Werden,
supra note 60, at 532.
2"3 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.18. See also notes 105-10 supra and
accompanying text.
24 See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
2,5 See text accompanying notes 122 & 166 supra. See also R. POSNER, supra note 31,
at 131-32 (products and services meeting the "practical indicia" criteria are "good
substitutes"). But see Werden, supra note 60, at 575 (markets, as opposed to submarkets,
are not delineated using Brown Shoe-type "practical indicia"; the 1982 Guidelines, however,
use market criteria similar to the more simplistic "practical indicia").
246 Compare E. SINGER, supra note 34, at 56 (supports defining the market by using
"reasonable interchangeability at the competitive price") with R. POSNER, supra note 31,
at 131-32 (supporting the apparent pragmatic approach of the 1982 Guidelines).
247 Because "it is only the notion of cross-elasticity that is useful [and] not the measure
itself," the 1982 Guidelines implicitly reject cross-elasticity as a market boundary test.
Werden, supra note 60, at 572-73 & n.149.
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ment chose to define product markets (not submarkets) according
to "functional interchangeability" and practical indicia, without
requiring fungibility.
24
Third, the Department placed an emphasis on the necessity of
producing economic evidence to prove or disprove that a merger
demonstrates a substantial probability of anticompetitive effects.2 49
According to the Chief Economist of the Department's Antitrust
Division, the use of hypothetical five percent price increases en-
courages the use of econometrics and discourages the use of those
"seat-of-the-pants" methods previously used to define relevant
product markets.250 Although probably willing to admit that any
definition of a relevant product market is at best an
approximation,25' the Department is clearly encouraging statistical
accuracy to dispel the previously inherent guesswork aspects of
product market definition. 252 Thus, it seems the Department has
targeted shading for extinction because shading is mathematically
crude and reflects guesswork.252 In addition, the Department will
be unable to utilize its hypothetical five percent price increases for
defining the relevant product market unless it first disaggregates
a product market represented as a "cluster" into separate markets
comprising individually priced products and services.254
24 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.
2.9 Id.
250 See notes 117-21 supra and accompanying text.
22: See Chief Economist, supra note 117, at 1302 ("While Justice will be looking for
as much quantitative information as possible, it will recognize the limitations of the exer-
cises prescribed by the merger guidelines."). See also note 206 supra for statement of Justice
Harlan's view that market definitions are necessarily approximations.
252 See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
-' Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 n.40 (1963) (noting
the lack of precision in shading).
24 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4501. See also text accompanying notes
118-21 supra. "Interest-sensitive" customers can shop around because many banks separately
price their individual services. Note, supra note 127, at 753-54. "Separately priced [ser-
vices] cannot be typified as 'clustered.' " Id. at 753 n.135.
The 1982 Guidelines reject the idea that Brown Shoe-type submarkets are valuable
for antitrust analysis. Instead, those guidelines only consider a market defined as a group
of products and an area "such that a hypothetical monopolist of those products in that
area would increase price significantly" to be significant. Werden, supra note 60, at 575.
"[Tjhe [1982] Guidelines recognize that there may be markets within markets; the
Guidelines' definition of a market generally implies an infinite number of concentric
markets." Id. Antitrust analysis pursuant to those guidelines considers "only the smallest
of these markets to be relevant." Id. The "smallest market" is that market comprising "the
smallest [geographic] area and group of products that clearly constitute a market." Id. at
578.
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A literal reading of the 1982 Guidelines also suggests that thrifts
may be included in the same line of commerce with commercial
banks without requiring those thrifts to become "significant par-
ticipants" or to display actual "competitive overlap" in the
marketing of assets to commercial enterprises. 2" Recent federal and
state legislation, including the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, authorize certain thrifts to par-
ticipate in banking markets previously occupied only by commer-
cial banks. 25 6 As a result, case law and agency opinions reflect a
belief that certain thrifts are approaching parity with commercial
banks in many aspects of the banking business. 25 7 Although those
thrifts generally have not actually committed their assets to the full
extent of their authorized participation in those banking markets,
25
1
the 1982 Guidelines suggest that those thrifts authorized to engage
in commercial banking activities may be included in the same prod-
uct market with commercial banks if a five percent increase in
"I See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.
The potential weakness of ... a market based solely on existing patterns of
supply and demand is that those patterns might change substantially if the
prices of the products included in the ... market were to increase .... The
Department will add additional products to the market if a significant percent-
age of the buyers of products already included would be likely to shift to those
other products in response to a small but significant and non-transitory in-
crease in price.
Id. at 4502.10
[P]roduction substitution may allow firms that do not currently produce the
relevant product to respond effectively to an increase in the price of that
product.
If a firm has existing productive and distributive facilities that could easily
and economically be used to produce and sell the relevant product within six
months in response to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in
price, the Department will include those facilities in the market.
Id. at 4502.201. See also Werden, supra note 60, at 523 & n.32 (assigned market shares
may include firms not actually competing currently).
The courts and the Board have required actual and significant participation in com-
mercial banking activities before thrifts can and will be included in the same product market
with commercial banks. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 663-66
(1974). See also note 197 supra for a list of district court cases. But see First Bancorpora-
tion, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 769 (1982).
"' See note 197 supra.
257 See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 666; United Bank
Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 861 (1981).
2I Cf. United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. at 665-66 (Court observed
practical impediment to thrift participation in the commercial loan market and the conse-
quent slight participation).
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prices of products and services offered by commercial banks would
cause a significant percentage of consumers of those products and
services to substitute the functional equivalents offered by thrifts
within one year of the price increase.
259
The 1982 Guidelines further provide that the Department will
include in the relevant line of commerce with commercial banks
only that thrift capacity, represented by market share, likely to be
used in response to a hypothetical price increase by commercial
banks in products and services for which thrifts offer good
substitutes.260 Thus, if a mutual savings bank is authorized to
dedicate only five percent of its assets to commercial loans, the
Department may include that five percent, to the extent those assets
are not otherwise committed, in the relevant product market.
261
Finally, fragmentation of the cluster of products and services
into individual product markets pursuant to the 1982 Guidelines
is more consistent with the Clayton Act section 7 incipiency
standard. 262 Individual product market analysis focuses upon those
points where two related industries, commercial banks and thrifts,
are attempting to expand their respective shares at the expense of
each other through demand deposits and commercial loans, and
thus recognizes "meaningful competition where it is found to
exist. ' 263 Moreover, the distinctions between commercial banks and
thrifts have become blurred as a result of recent trends in
legislation, 264 judicial opinions,2 65 and agency decisions. 266 Thus,
2I The 1982 Guidelines do not require actual or present participation. The product
market is defined, after first postulating a provisional market comprising "good substitutes,"
by expanding that product market to include all "good substitutes," a significant percent-
age of which consumers would use within one year after a nontransitory five percent in-
crease in price of the product or service. Thus, if commercial banks increasing commer-
cial loan prices by five percent would cause a significant percentage of the consumers of
those loans to take their business to a mutual savings bank or a savings and loan in the
same geographic market, the Department would include that thrift's market share of com-
mercial loans in its antitrust analysis. See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, 4510(2), at 6882.
260 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4502.10, .40.
2 Under the MCA such a 5% limit is imposed on federal mutual savings banks. See
note 197 supra.
2 See notes 127-50, 167-92 supra and accompanying text.
2 Cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (Court used sub-
markets in its analysis).
264 See note 197 supra.
265 Id.
26 See, e.g., Northeast Bancorporation, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 375 (1974).
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industry recognition of uniqueness, so important to the determina-
tion in Grinnell that a cluster of services constituted the relevant
product market,"6 7 no longer exists in the banking and thrift
industries.
C. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
It is too early to pass judgment on the efficacy of the Depart-
ment's use of the HHI in the 1982 Guidelines. The HHI theoreti-
cally exhibits two advantages over the four-firm concentration ratio
previously used in the 1968 Guidelines: the HHI is both a sum-
mary measure of the entire market and a measure of size dispar-
ity between the individual firms within that market. 68 Both the
HHI and the four-firm concentration ratio share a common
weakness: neither method can reliably relate its characteristic
measurements unless the product and geographic markets surveyed
are accurately defined. 6 9 Because of its overweighting feature, the
HHI may provide more distorted information than the four-firm
concentration ratio if the relevant market is inaccurately defined. " '
Thus, given the uncertainty inherent in defining the relevant pro-
duct market in banking mergers and the close correlation existing
between the HHI and the four-firm concentration ratio,"' it is
questionable whether the HHI provides any distinct benefit.
CONCLUSION
An attorney advising a commercial bank about a proposed
merger or arguing the merits of that merger before a regulatory
agency or a court must recognize that the Department of Justice,
through the promulgation of the 1982 Guidelines, has joined the
ranks of those courts, agencies, and legal scholars suggesting a re-
evaluation of the product market definition relevant to the antitrust
analysis of commercial bank mergers.
More importantly, that attorney must recognize that the
26, See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572-74 (1963).
26 See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
269 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
270 See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
27 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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Department, pursuant to the Guidelines, may evaluate a proposed
merger by analzying anticompetitive effects on the individual prod-
uct markets comprising the cluster of products and services refer-
red to as "commercial banking," which previously had been the
focus of market analysis. That method of analysis may appear to
be less stringent, given the allowance for the competition
represented by those thrifts present in the geographic market.
Nevertheless, individual product market analysis is a sword that
cuts both ways: a bank merger may be challenged by the Depart-
ment because of a substantial probability of anticompetitive effect
on one or more of the individual product markets represented, even
though the "cluster" of products and services heretofore known
as "commercial banking" remains competitive. Furthermore, sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act provides adeijuate justification for the
Department, utilizing the 1982 Guidelines, to look beyond the
cluster by conducting antitrust analysis on those individual prod-
uct markets: enforcement actions pursuant to section 7 are de-
signed to thwart in its incipiency economic concentration and the
possibility of collusion. Banking institutions considering a merger,
therefore, should be prepared to demonstrate that the merger does
not violate the antitrust laws when using either the "cluster" prod-
uct market definition or individual product market analysis.
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